

Auckland Regional Public Health Service

Rātonga Hauora ā Iwi o Tamaki Makaurau



Working with the people of Auckland, Counties Manukau and Waitemata

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Prepared by: [Dr Craig Thornley](#) and Dr Wing Cheuk Chan

Website: www.arphs.govt.nz (+ follow [link](#))

International Situation

No new human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) have been reported on the WHO website since 19/06/08 ([WHO](#)).

Details of recently-reported poultry outbreaks

Vietnam OIE 14/07/08. A total of 15 poultry outbreaks of H5N1 were reported from 24/04/08 to 14/07/08 in Vietnam (see [map](#)). Potential sources of outbreak identified include illegal movement of animals; introduction of new live animals and fomites such as feeds, and vehicles. 2 outbreaks occurred in Can Tho City on 25/04, 17/05, with 1131 and 400 cases respectively. 4 Outbreaks were reported in Tra Vinh with 500 cases on 5/05, 350 cases on 6/05 and 150 on 26/05 and 1000 cases on 24/06. Other outbreaks occur in Son La (with 95 cases) on 22/04, Vinh Long (300) on 24/04, Long An (200) on 1/05, Tra Vinh (500) on 5/05, Ha Tinh (400) on 24/05, Nghe An (500) 26/05, Quang Ngai (570) on 12/06, (55) on 18/06.

Egypt OIE, 07/07/08. A total of 19 poultry outbreaks of H5N1 have been reported since 7/02/08 in Egypt (see [map](#)). 2 outbreaks occurred in Al Jizah involving 75,000 layer chickens on 18/05 and 1/06. A further 15,000 layer chickens were susceptible in an outbreak in Suhaj on 28/05. 10,000 broiler chicken in Ash Sharqiyah were susceptible in an outbreak. 7 smaller outbreaks were reported in Al Gharbiyah involving a total of 212 backyard or live market chickens and ducks. 3 outbreaks in Al Minufiyah involving 26 chickens and ducks. Other poultry outbreaks were reported in Kafr Ash Shaykh (22 chickens), Ad Daqahliyah (36 and 25), Al Minya (10), and Luxor (18).

Nigeria OIE, 24/07/08; 25/07/08. Four poultry outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza have been reported from Nigeria (see [map](#)). Outbreaks were reported in Katsina, and Kano involving 110 and 4253 birds respectively. Two cases were identified from routine surveillance from live bird markets in Kebbi and Gambe.

Background

Science into policy: preparing for pandemic influenza [Harper DL et al. J Public Health 2008; doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdn049. published online 04/07/08.](#) This editorial describes the scientific advisory process that has informed the current UK pandemic preparedness plans. The final endorsed scientific papers are available at www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/spi/evidence.htm, and concern use of antiviral drugs, pre-pandemic and pandemic-specific vaccines, antibiotics for pandemic influenza, use of face masks and the risk of a pandemic originating from H5N1.

Guidance on allocating and targeting pandemic influenza vaccine [US HHS/DHS 07/08.](#) This document provides US government guidance for planning provision pandemic influenza vaccination.

Pandemic Postings

Current global avian influenza activity

Confirmed human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1), 20 June - 1 August 2008¹, and reported outbreaks of highly-pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in poultry 27 June - 25 July 2008.² The complete list of human cases and poultry outbreaks to date can be found on the [ARPHS website](#).

	Human ¹		Poultry ²
	cases	deaths	outbreaks
Egypt	-	-	19
Vietnam	-	-	15
Nigeria	-	-	4
Total	0	0	38

Notes:

1 As reported by [World Health Organization](#)

2 As reported by the [World Organisation for Animal Health \(OIE\)](#).

Background (contd)

Systematic evaluation of proposed guidance for community mitigation of pandemic influenza [Davey VJ et al. PLoS ONE 2008; 3\(7\): e2606. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002606.](#) This paper reports results of a systematic simulation of a broad range of pandemic scenarios and mitigation strategies. The researchers found that mitigation success depends on rapid strategy implementation, high compliance, regional mitigation, and rigorous rescinding criteria. The authors recommend that preparation and public education is required for long-lasting, high community compliance during a pandemic.

Bacterial pneumonia and pandemic influenza planning [Gupta RK et al. Emerg Infect Dis 2008; 14: 1187-92.](#) The authors of this perspectives article claim that far less work has been conducted on planning for deployment of antimicrobial drugs against secondary bacterial pneumonia in an influenza pandemic than on antiviral drugs and vaccines, even though effective antimicrobial drug measures are expected to substantially benefit public health. This article addresses issues regarding use of antimicrobial drugs as stocks of individual agents are diminished and the role of resistance surveillance in informing policy, and the role of vaccination with polysaccharide and conjugate pneumococcal vaccines is part of a pandemic strategy.

Immune correlates of protection against influenza A viruses in support of pandemic vaccine development [Eichelberger M et al. Vaccine 2008; 26: 4299-303.](#) This article reports findings from an FDA/NIH/WHO public workshop on immune correlates of protection against influenza A viruses in support of pandemic vaccine development, held 10-11 2007. Topics reviewed and discussed includes (i) current knowledge regarding immune correlates of protection against seasonal influenza; (ii) human immune responses to avian influenza infection and vaccines for novel influenza viruses; (iii) limitations of currently available assays to evaluate vaccine immunogenicity; and (iv) potential insights from animal models for correlates of protection against avian influenza.

Checklist of key legal issues for pandemic influenza healthcare service providers [American Health Lawyers Association, 05/08.](#) US checklist of health legal issues that may be encountered in pandemic planning or response. While the detail is clearly embedded in the US legal context, the key points may have equal relevance to New Zealand.

Ministry of Health advice line: 0800 AVN FLU (286 358)

MAF Hotline (for suspect animal cases): 0800 809 966

Disclaimer: Background material is listed in Pandemic Postings to alert recipients to new publications on highly-pathogenic avian and pandemic influenza topics. While efforts are made to maintain quality by only including material from reputable sources, it is beyond the scope of this bulletin to independently establish the veracity of this material, or to place the material within the local pandemic planning context: such assessments are left to the judgement of the readership. Conclusions made by authors of material cited in this bulletin do not necessarily represent policy or opinions of Auckland Regional Public Health Service, of Waitemata, Auckland or Counties Manukau DHBs, or of the Ministry of Health.